Lecture 6: Growth 第六讲：增长

Lecture 6: Growth

第六讲：增长

第6讲课程视频

讨论地址:http://www.huomen.com/topic-show-id-103.html

This is awesome; I’ve been watching the lectures on this course, and isn’t it absolutely amazing, the content? And now, you’re stuck with me. We’ll see how that goes.
这真是太棒了，我一直在看这门课的讲座，内容是不是太棒了？现在，你被我困住了。我们拭目以待。
Unlike Paul when he was talking in the Q&A and you guys asked him what he’d do if he was in college today and he said physics, I actually indulged myself. I went and did physics at Cambridge. I think physics is an amazing class to give you transferable skills that are really useful in other areas, but that’s not why you’re listening to me today; physics isn’t the class.
不像保罗在问答中说的，你们问他如果他今天上大学会做什么，他说物理，我其实是放纵了自己。我去剑桥做物理。我认为物理是一门了不起的课程，它能让你掌握在其他领域非常有用的可转移技能，但这不是你今天听我讲的原因；物理不是这门课。
So I paid for college doing online marketing, directions marketing. I started with SEO in the 1990s. I created a paper airplane site, and had a monopoly in the small niche market of paper airplanes. When you want to start a startup also see how big the market could be. (In the long term, it wasn’t great.) But what that taught me was how to do SEO. And back in those days it was Alta Vista, and the way to do SEO was to have white text, on a white background, five pages below the fold, and you would rank top of Alta Vista if you just said planes 20 or 30 times in that text. And that was how you won SEO in the 1990s. It was a really, really easy skill to learn.
所以我花钱上大学做网络营销，方向营销。我从90年代开始做搜索引擎优化，创建了一个纸飞机网站，垄断了纸飞机这个小市场。当你想创业的时候，也要看看市场有多大。（从长远来看，这不是很好。）但这教会了我如何做搜索引擎优化。那时候是Alta Vista，做搜索引擎优化的方法是在白色背景上有白色的文本，在折叠下面有五页，如果你在文本中说了20到30次，你会排在Alta Vista的前面。这就是你在20世纪90年代赢得搜索引擎优化的原因。这是一项非常非常简单的技能。
When I went to college, being a physicist, I thought paper airplanes would make me cool. I was actually the nerdiest person in the physics class, so I created a cocktail site, which was how I learned to program and that grew to be the largest cocktail site in the UK. That really got me into SEO properly when Google launched. So with Google you had to worry about page rank and getting links back to your site, which basically at that stage meant one link from the Yahoo directory, got you to the top listing in Google if you had white text and a white background below the fold as well.
当我上大学的时候，作为一个物理学家，我认为纸飞机会让我变得很酷。我实际上是物理课上最书呆子的人，所以我创建了一个鸡尾酒网站，这是我学习编程的方式，后来成为英国最大的鸡尾酒网站。这真的让我进入搜索引擎优化适当当谷歌推出。因此，使用Google时，你不得不担心页面排名和链接返回到你的站点，这在那个阶段基本上意味着一个来自Yahoo目录的链接，如果你有白色文本和折叠下面的白色背景，你就可以进入Google的顶部列表。
When Google launched AdWords, that’s really when I started to do all my marketing. That meant buying paid clicks from Google and reselling them to eBay for a small margin of like 20% using their affiliate program. That was what really kicked me into overdrive, into doing what everyone nowadays talks about as growth, growth hacking or growth marketing. In my mind it’s just internet marketing using whatever channel you can to get whatever output you want, and that’s how I paid for college and that’s how I went from being a physicist to a Marketer – transitioning to the darkside of the force.
当谷歌推出AdWords时，我才真正开始做我所有的营销工作。这意味着从谷歌购买付费点击，然后用他们的代销商程序以20%的利润转售给eBay。这是真正把我踢到超速，做什么，现在每个人都谈论的增长，增长黑客或增长营销。在我看来，这只是网络营销，利用任何渠道，你可以得到任何输出你想要的，这就是我如何支付大学，这就是我如何从一个物理学家到营销-过渡到黑暗的力量。
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So what do you think matters most for growth? You’ve had tons of lectures, and people have said it over and over, so what do you guys think matters most for growth?
那么你认为什么对增长最重要呢？你们已经听了很多讲座，人们一遍又一遍地说，你们认为什么对成长最重要？
Audience: Great product.
观众：好产品。
Schultz: What does a great product lead to?
舒尔茨：一个伟大的产品能带来什么？
Audience: Customers.
观众：顾客。
Schultz: And what do you need those customers to do?
舒尔茨：那你需要那些客户做什么呢？
Audience: Spread the word.
听众：传播这个消息。
Schultz: Yes that’s it, retention. Retention is the single most important thing for growth. Now we have an awesome growth team at Facebook and I’m super proud to work in it, but the truth of the matter is, we have a fantastic product. Getting to work on growth of Facebook is a massive privilege because we are promoting something that everyone in the world really wants to use, which is absolutely incredible. If we can get people on, and get them ramped up, they stick on Facebook.
舒尔茨：是的，就是这样。留住人才是成长中最重要的一件事。现在我们在Facebook有一个很棒的成长团队，我非常自豪能在其中工作，但事实是，我们有一个很棒的产品。致力于Facebook的发展是一项巨大的特权，因为我们正在推广世界上每个人都想使用的东西，这绝对是不可思议的。如果我们能让人们加入，并让他们提高，他们就会坚持在Facebook上。
So many times, I got to advise multiple startups. My favorite was working with Airbnb, but I’ve worked with Coursera, I’ve worked with other ones that haven’t done as well as those guys. But the one thing that’s true, over and over again is, if you look at this curve, ‘percent monthly active’ versus ‘number of days from acquisition’, if you end up with a retention curve that is asymptotic to a line parallel to the X-axis, you have a viable business and you have product market fit for some subset of market. But most of the companies that you see fly up, we’ve talked about packing and virality and all of this stuff, their retention curve slopes down toward the axis, and in the end, intercepts the X-axis.
很多次，我都要为多家初创公司提供建议。我最喜欢的是与Airbnb合作，但我与Coursera合作过，我与其他人合作过，他们的表现不如那些人。但有一点是正确的，反复地看，如果你看这条曲线，“月活跃率”与“收购天数”，如果你最终得到一条与X轴平行的保留曲线，你就有了一个可行的业务，你的产品市场适合某个市场子集。但是你看到的大多数公司都会飞起来，我们讨论过包装和病毒性以及所有这些东西，它们的保留曲线会朝着轴向下倾斜，最后会截住X轴。
Now when I show this job to people, they say that’s all well and good, you had a million people a day in terms of growth, when you started the growth team at Facebook, or ‘you were at 50 million users, you had a lot of people join your site so you had a ton of data to do this.’ We used the same methodology for our B2B growth , getting people to sign-up for services advertisements, we used this to understand how much growth we were going to have in that market as well. And at that point when I joined Facebook, the product was three days old. And within 90 days of the product launching, we were able to use this technique to figure out what the one year value of an advertiser was, and we predicted it for the first year to 97%. So I think it’s very important to look at your retention curve.
现在当我向人们展示这份工作时，他们说这一切都很好，你每天有100万人在增长，当你在Facebook成立增长团队时，或者说“你有5000万用户，你有很多人加入你的网站，所以你有大量的数据来做这件事。”我们在B2B增长中使用了相同的方法，吸引了很多人为了注册服务广告，我们用这个来了解我们在这个市场上也会有多大的增长。当我加入Facebook的时候，这个产品已经上市三天了。在产品发布后的90天内，我们利用这项技术计算出了广告客户一年的价值，并预测第一年的价值为97%。所以我认为看一下你的保留曲线是非常重要的。
If you see here, this red line is the ‘number of users’ who have been on your product for a certain number of days. So a bunch of people, will have been on the product at least one day, but if your product has been around for a year, you’ll have zero users who have been on it for 366 days. Make sense?
如果你在这里看到，这条红线是在你的产品上使用了一定天数的“用户数”。所以，一大群人，至少有一天会使用这个产品，但是如果你的产品已经使用了一年，你就没有用户使用它366天了。有道理？
So what you then do is look for all of your users who have been on your product one day. What percentage of them are monthly active? 100% for the first 30 days obviously, because monthly active, they also end up on one day. But then you look at 31. Every single user on their 31st day after registration, what percentage of them are monthly active? Thirty-second day, thirty-third day, thirty-fourth day. And that allows you, with only 10,000 customers, to get a real idea of what this curve is going to look like for your product. And you’re going to be able to tell, is it asymptotic? It’ll get noisy towards the right side, like I’ m not using real data, but you’ll be able to get a handle on, whether this curve flattens out or does it not. If it doesn’t flatten out, don’t go into growth tactics, don’t do virality, don’t hire a growth hacker. Focus on getting product market fit, because in the end, as Sam said in the beginning of this course: idea, product, team, execution. If you don’t have a great product, there’s no point in executing more on growing it because it won’t grow. Number one problem I’ve seen, inside Facebook for new products, number one problem I’ve seen for startups, is they don’t actually have product market fit, when they think they do.
所以你接下来要做的就是寻找所有曾经使用过你的产品的用户。他们每月活跃的百分比是多少？很明显，前30天是100%，因为每个月都很活跃，所以最后一天也是这样。但当你看到31岁的时候。每个用户在注册后的第31天，他们每月活跃的百分比是多少？第三十二天，第三十三天，第三十四天。这使得你，只有10000个客户，能够真正了解你的产品曲线是什么样子的。你能分辨出来，是渐进的吗？它的右边会变得很吵，就像我没有使用真实的数据，但是你可以得到一个句柄，不管曲线是否变平。如果它不平坦下来，不要进入增长策略，不要做病毒式的，不要雇用一个增长黑客。专注于让产品适应市场，因为最终，正如山姆在本课程开始时所说：理念、产品、团队、执行。如果你没有一个好的产品，就没有必要对它进行更多的增长，因为它不会增长。我看到的第一个问题，在Facebook内部的新产品，第一个问题我看到的创业公司，是他们实际上没有产品市场适合，当他们认为他们这样做。
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So the next question that people ask over and over again is, what does good retention look like? Sure! I can have 5% retention, but I’m guessing Facebook had better than that. That’s not going to be a successful business. I get really pissed off when people ask me that question, because I think you can figure it out. I love this story; this is like my one gratuitous story (link on powerpoint) that I’m throwing out here, so the rest of it may not be as gratuitous. But this is a picture that was published in Life Magazine in 1950 of one of the Trinity nuclear bomb tests. There’s a guy named Jeffrey Taylor. He was a British Physicist who ended up winning the Nobel Prize. He was able to figure out, from looking at this picture (picture on powerpoint) what the power of the U.S. atomic bomb was, and Russians were publishing similar pictures, just using dimensional reasoning. Dimensional reasoning was one of the best skills I learned during my time studying physics back in the UK.
所以人们反复问的下一个问题是，好的保留率是什么样子的？当然！我可以有5%的保留率，但我猜Facebook比这更好。这不是一个成功的生意。当别人问我这个问题时，我真的很生气，因为我觉得你能弄明白。我喜欢这个故事；这就像我在这里抛出的一个免费故事（powerpoint上的链接），所以它的其余部分可能不是免费的。但这是1950年发表在《生活》杂志上的一张三位一体核弹试验的照片。有个叫杰弗里·泰勒的家伙。他是英国物理学家，最终获得了诺贝尔奖。他通过看这张图片（powerpoint上的图片）就知道了美国原子弹的威力，俄罗斯人也发表了类似的图片，只是使用了维度推理。维度推理是我在英国学习物理期间学到的最好的技能之一。
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What dimensional reasoning is, you look at the dimensions that are involved in a problem, so you want to figure out energy, newtons, meters, newtons as a kilogram, meters seconds to minus two. You want to figure out kilograms, meters squared, seconds to minus two, and then you try to figure out how you can get each of those numbers from what data you have. The mass is the volume of this sphere, so that’s a meter cubed, so you’ve got meters to five over seconds to minus two and he was able to use that to figure out what the power of this atomic bomb was and what the ratios of the power between the Russian and the U.S. atomic bomb was, and essentially reveal one of the top secrets that existed in the world at that time.
什么是量纲推理，你看一个问题所涉及的量纲，所以你想计算出能量，牛顿，米，牛顿，一公斤，米，秒到负二。你要计算出公斤，米的平方，秒到负二，然后你试着找出如何从你拥有的数据中得到这些数字。质量是这个球体的体积，这是一米的立方，所以你得到了米到五，再加上秒到零下二，他能够用它来计算出这个原子弹的威力，以及俄罗斯和美国原子弹的威力之比，基本上揭示了世界上存在的一个最高机密当时的世界。
That’s a hard problem. Figuring out what Facebook’s retention rate is, is not a hard problem. How many people are there on the internet? 2.4 billion, 2.3 billion. Okay, Facebook is banned in China, so what now?
这是个难题。弄清楚Facebook的保留率并不是一个难题。网上有多少人？24亿，23亿。好吧，Facebook在中国是被禁止的，那现在呢？
Audience: 2 billion.
观众：20亿。
Schultz: So 2 billion people on the internet. Facebook said around 1.3 billion users in terms of active users. You can divide those numbers by each other. And yet that won’t give you the right answer. Of course not! But it’s going to give you close enough to a ballpark answer of what the retention rate looks like for Facebook. If we signed everyone on the internet up, then you will know it’s higher than that. Similarly, if you look at WhatsApp. They’ve announced 600 million active users. How many people have Smart Phones? You can figure out that number – that number is out knocking around. It can give you an idea of how many users there are. Amazon has a had a pop at signing up almost everyone in the United States. You know how many people are online in the United States, and you have a good idea of how many customers Amazon has from the numbers they throw out. Different verticals need different terminal retention rates for them to have successful businesses. If you’re on ecommerce and you’re retaining on a monthly active basis, like 20 to 30% of your users, you’re going to do very well. If you’re on social media, and the first batch of people signing up to your product are not like, 80% retained, you’re not going to have a massive social media site. So it really depends on the vertical you’re in, what the retention rates are. What you need to do is have the tools to think, ‘who out there is comparable’ and how you can look at it and say, ‘am I anywhere close to what real success looks like in this vertical?’
舒尔茨：互联网上有20亿人。Facebook表示，活跃用户约为13亿。你可以把这些数字除以。但这并不能给你正确的答案。当然不是！但这会让你对Facebook的保留率给出一个大致的答案。如果我们每个人都在网上注册的话，你就会知道比这个数字还高。同样，如果你看看WhatsApp。他们宣布有6亿活跃用户。有多少人有智能手机？你可以算出那个数字-那个数字是敲来敲去的。它可以让你知道有多少用户。亚马逊在美国几乎所有人的注册上都很抢手。你知道在美国有多少人在上网，你也能从亚马逊的用户数量中很好地了解他们。不同的垂直行业需要不同的终端保留率才能成功开展业务。如果你是从事电子商务的，而且你每月都保持活跃，比如20%到30%的用户，你会做得很好。如果你在社交媒体上，第一批注册你产品的人不喜欢，80%的保留率，你就不会有一个庞大的社交媒体网站。所以这取决于你所处的垂直方向，你的保留率是多少。你需要做的是拥有思考的工具，‘谁是可比的’，以及你如何看待它并说，‘我在这方面接近真正的成功吗？’
Retention is the single most important thing for growth and retention comes from having a great idea and a great product to back up that idea, and great product market fit. The way we look at, whether a product has great retention or not, is whether or not the users who install it, actually stay on it long-term, when you normalize on a cohort basis, and I think that’s a really good methodology for looking at your product and say ‘okay the first 100, the first 1,000, the first 10,000 people I get on this, will they be retained in the long-run?
挽留是成长中最重要的一件事，挽留来自于拥有一个伟大的想法和一个伟大的产品来支持这个想法，以及伟大的产品市场适合度。我们看一个产品是否有很好的保留率，是看安装它的用户是否真的长期使用它，当你在队列的基础上正常化时，我认为这是一个非常好的方法来看待你的产品，并说“好的，第一个100，第一个1000，第一个10000人，它们会长期保留吗？
So now, how do you attack operating for growth? Let’s say you have awesome product market fit. You’ve built an ecommerce site, and you have 60% of people coming back every single month, and making a purchase from you, which would be absolutely fantastic. How do you then take that, and say, ‘now it’s time to scale.’ (Now it’s time to execute was the last thing on your forum right? *to moderator*.) That’s where I think growth teams come in.
那么，现在，您如何通过运营来实现增长呢？假设你的产品适合市场。你已经建立了一个电子商务网站，你有60%的人每个月回来，并从你那里购买，这将是绝对美妙的。你怎么能接受这个，然后说，‘现在是时候扩大规模了’（现在是时候执行了，这是你论坛上的最后一件事，对吧？*主持人*）这就是我认为成长团队的用武之地。

My contrarian viewpoint is, if you’re a startup, you shouldn’t have a growth team. Startups should not have growth teams. The whole company should be the growth team. The CEO should be the head of growth. You need someone to set a North star for you about where the company wants to go, and that person needs to be the person leading the company, from my opinion, that’s what I’ve seen. Mark is a fantastic example of that. Back when Facebook started, a lot of people were putting out their registered user numbers. Right? You’d see you registered user numbers for MySpace, you’d see a registered user numbers for ___11:38, you’d see registered user numbers. Mark put out monthly active users, as the number both internally he held everyone to, and said we need everyone on Facebook, but that means everyone active on Facebook, not everyone signed up on Facebook, so monthly active people was the number internally, and it was also the number he published externally. It was the number he made the whole world hold Facebook to, as a number that we cared about. If you look at what Jan has done with WhatsApp I think that’s another great example. He always published sends numbers.
我的相反观点是，如果你是一个初创企业，你不应该有一个成长团队。初创公司不应该有成长团队。整个公司都应该是成长团队。首席执行官应该是增长主管。你需要有人为你设定一个北极星，告诉你公司想去哪里，而这个人需要成为公司的领导者，在我看来，这就是我所看到的。马克就是一个很好的例子。早在Facebook成立的时候，很多人都在公布自己的注册用户号码。正确的？你会看到你为MySpace注册的用户号码，你会看到注册的用户号码，你会看到注册的用户号码。马克公布了每月活跃用户数，因为这个数字是他内部给每个人的，他说我们需要Facebook上的每个人，但这意味着每个人都在Facebook上活跃，不是每个人都在Facebook上注册，所以每月活跃用户数是内部的数字，也是他对外公布的数字。这是他让全世界都拥有Facebook的数字，作为一个我们关心的数字。如果你看看简用WhatsApp做了什么，我认为这是另一个很好的例子。他总是公布数字。
If you’re a messaging application, sends is probably the single most important number. If people use you once a day, maybe that’s great, but you’re not really their primary messaging mechanism, so Jan published the sends number. Inside Airbnb, they talk about ‘nights booked’ and also published that in all of the infographics you see in side TechCrunch. They always benchmark themselves against how many nights booked they have compared to the largest hotel chains in the world. They have at each of these companies, a different north star. The north star doesn’t have to be the number of active users for every different vertical. For eBay, it was gross merchandise volume. How much stuff did people actually buy through eBay? Everyone externally tends to judge eBay based on revenue. Actually, Benedict Evans has done this amazing breakdown of Amazon’s business, which is really interesting to look at their marketplace business versus their direct business. So eBay is all marketplace business, right? So eBay’s being judged by its revenue, when it actually has 10 times Gross Merchandise Volume going through the site. That was the number that eBay looked at when I was working there. Every different company when it thinks about growth, needs a different North star; however, when you are operating for growth it is critical that you have that North star, and you define as a leader.
如果您是一个消息传递应用程序，sends可能是最重要的数字。如果人们每天使用你一次，也许这很好，但你并不是他们的主要信息传递机制，所以简公布了发送号码。在Airbnb内部，他们谈论“预订的夜数”，并在您在side TechCrunch中看到的所有信息图表中公布了这一点。与世界上最大的连锁酒店相比，他们总是将自己的预订量作为基准。他们每个公司都有不同的北极星。北极星不一定是每个不同垂直方向的活跃用户数。对于eBay来说，这是商品总量。人们到底通过eBay买了多少东西？外部每个人都倾向于根据收入来判断eBay。实际上，本尼迪克特·埃文斯对亚马逊的业务进行了惊人的细分，看看他们的市场业务和直接业务，这真的很有趣。所以eBay完全是市场交易，对吧？因此，eBay是根据其收入来判断的，而实际上它的商品总量是网站的10倍。这是我在eBay工作时看到的号码。每一个不同的公司在考虑增长时，都需要一个不同的北极星；然而，当你在为增长而运营时，拥有北极星是至关重要的，你要把北极星定义为领导者。
The reason this matters is, the second you have more than one person working on something, you cannot control what everyone else is doing. I promise you, having now hit 100 people I’m managing, I have no control. It’s all influence. It’s like I tell one person to do one thing, but the other 99 are going to do whatever they want. And the thing is, it’s not clear to everybody what the most important thing is for a company. It would be very easy for people inside eBay to say, ‘you know what? we should focus on revenue,’ or ‘we should focus on the number of people buying from us’ or ‘we should focus on how many people list items on eBay.’ And Pierre, and Meg, and John, those guys as various leaders, have always said ‘no, its the amount of Gross Merchandise Volume that goes through our site, the percentage of e-commerce that goes through our site, that is what really matters for this company. This means that when someone is having a conversation and you’re not in the room, or when they’re sitting in front of their computer screens, and thinking about how they built this particular project or this particular feature, in their head it’s going to be clear to them that it’s not about revenue, it’s about Gross Merchandise Volume, or it’s not about getting more registrations, registrations don’t matter, unless they become long-term active users. A great example of this was when I was at eBay in 2004, we changed they way we paid our affiliates for new users. Affiliate programs are a bit out of fashion these days, but the idea of an affiliate program is essentially, you pay anyone on the internet a referral for sending traffic to your site, but it’s mostly about getting access to big marketers who do it on their own.
这很重要的原因是，当你有一个以上的人在做某件事的时候，你不能控制其他人在做什么。我向你保证，现在我已经管理了100个人，我无法控制。都是影响力。就像我告诉一个人去做一件事，但其他99个人想做什么就做什么。问题是，对于一家公司来说，什么是最重要的还不是每个人都清楚。易趣内部的人很容易就会说，‘你知道吗？我们应该关注收入，或者说“我们应该关注从我们这里购买商品的人数”，或者“我们应该关注有多少人在易趣上列出商品”，皮埃尔、梅格和约翰，这些人作为不同的领导者，总是说“不，这是通过我们网站的商品总量，是电子商务的百分比。”通过我们的网站，这才是真正重要的公司。这意味着，当有人在谈话时，你不在房间里，或者当他们坐在电脑屏幕前，思考他们如何构建这个特定的项目或这个特定的功能时，在他们的头脑中，他们会很清楚，这不是收入的问题，而是商品总量的问题，或者不是为了获得更多的注册，注册并不重要，除非他们成为长期活跃用户。这方面的一个很好的例子是2004年我在eBay时，我们改变了他们为新用户支付附属公司费用的方式。联属计划是有点过时了，但联属计划的想法基本上是，你支付任何人在互联网上向你的网站发送流量转介，但它主要是关于获得大营销谁做自己的访问。

We were paying for confirmed registered users, so all of our affiliates were lined up on getting confirmed registered users to the eBay site. We changed our payment model to pay for activated confirmed registered users. So you had to confirm your account and then bid on an item, or buy or list an item, to become someone that we paid for. Overnight when we made that change, we lost something like 20% of confirmed registered users that were being driven by the affiliates. But the ACRUs (15:45) only dropped by about 5%. The ratio between CRU to ACRU went up, and then, the growth of ACRUs massively accelerated. The cause of this is, if you want to drive CRU, if someone searches for a trampoline, you land them on the registration page because they link you have to register and confirm before they get their trampoline. If you want to drive ACRUs, you land them on the search results page, within eBay for trampolines, so they can see the thing they want to buy, get excited, and then register when they want to buy it. And if you drive just CRUs, people don’t have an amazing magic moment on eBay, when they visit the site. And that’s the next most important thing to think about: How do you drive to the magic moment that gets people hooked on your service.
我们为已确认的注册用户付费，所以我们所有的分支机构都在排队等待将已确认的注册用户转到易趣网站。我们改变了我们的支付模式，以支付激活确认注册用户。所以你必须确认你的帐户，然后出价的项目，或购买或上市的项目，成为一个人，我们支付。一夜之间，当我们做出改变，我们失去了大约20%的确认注册用户是由分支机构驱动的。但是ACRUs（15:45）只下降了5%。CRU与ACRU的比值上升，ACRU的生长速度大大加快。原因是，如果你想驾驶CRU，如果有人搜索蹦床，你会把他们放在注册页面上，因为他们链接你必须在他们拿到蹦床之前注册并确认。如果你想驾驶ACRUs，你可以把它们放在搜索结果页面上，在eBay内寻找蹦床，这样他们就可以看到自己想买的东西，兴奋起来，然后在想买的时候注册。如果你只开CRUs，人们在eBay上就不会有神奇的时刻，当他们访问这个网站的时候。接下来要考虑的最重要的一点是：你怎样才能让人们对你的服务着迷呢。
In the lecture notes for this course, I’ve stuck in a bunch of links to people I think are brilliant at this stuff. For example, regarding the retention curve I showed you earlier, there’s a link to this guy Danny Ferante who is incredible talking about retention curves. The magic moment there are two videos linked: one is Chamath talking about growth, who is the guy who set up the growth team at Facebook, and the other, is my friend Naomi and I talking at f8 four years about how we were thinking about growth back then. In both of those videos, we talk about the magic moment. What do you think the magic moment is for when you’re signing up to Facebook?
在本课程的课堂讲稿中，我找到了一些我认为在这方面很出色的人的链接。举个例子，关于我之前给你们展示的保留曲线，有一个链接指向丹尼·费兰特，他说的保留曲线真是不可思议。神奇时刻有两个视频链接在一起：一个是Chamath谈论增长，他是在Facebook建立增长团队的人，另一个是我和我的朋友Naomi在f8四年前谈论我们当时是如何看待增长的。在这两个视频中，我们都谈到了神奇的时刻。当你注册Facebook的时候，你觉得这个神奇的时刻是为了什么？
Audience: See your friends.
观众：看看你的朋友。
Schultz: See your friends. Simple as that. I’ve talked to so many companies, and they try to get incredibly complicated about what they’re doing, but it is just as simple as when you see the first picture of one of your friends on Facebook, you go ‘Oh my God, this is what this site is about!’ Zuckerberg talked at Y Combinator about getting people to 10 friends in 14 days; that is why we focus on this metric. The number one most important thing in a social media site is connecting to your friends, because without that, you have a completely empty newsfeed, and clearly you’re not going to come back; you’ll never get any notifications, and you’ll never get any friends telling you about things they are missing on the site.
舒尔茨：看看你的朋友。就这么简单。我已经和很多公司谈过了，他们试图把他们正在做的事情弄得难以置信的复杂，但这就像你在Facebook上看到你的一个朋友的第一张照片一样简单，你会说‘哦，天哪，这就是这个网站的意义！扎克伯格在Y Combinator上说，要让人们在14天内交到10个朋友；这就是为什么我们关注这个指标。在社交媒体网站中，最重要的事情是与你的朋友建立联系，因为如果没有这一点，你就有一个完全空的新闻源，显然你不会回来了；你永远不会收到任何通知，你也永远不会有朋友告诉你他们在网站上丢失的东西。
So for Facebook the magic moment, is that moment when you see your friend’s face, and everything we do on growth, if you look at the Linkedin registration flow, you look at the Twitter registration flow, or you look at what WhatsApp does when you sign up, the number one thing all these services look to do, is show you the people you want to follow, connect to, send messages to, as quickly as possible, because in this vertical, this is what matters. When you think about Airbnb or eBay, it’s about finding that unique item, that PEZ dispenser or broken laser pointer, that you really really cared about and want to get ahold of. Like when you see that collectible that you are missing, that is the real magic moment on eBay. When you look on Airbnb and you find that first listing, that cool house you can stay in, and when you go through the door, that’s a magic moment. Similarly on the other side, when you’re listing your house, that first time you get paid, is your magic moment or when you list an item on eBay, the first time you get paid, is your magic moment. You should ask Brian what he thinks, because they’ve done these amazing story boards which I think has been shared, about the journey through a user’s life on Airbnb and how exciting it is. He’ll be talking in around three lectures time; he’s awesome about talking about the magic moment, and getting users to feel the love, joy, and all this stuff.
所以对于Facebook来说，神奇的时刻，就是当你看到你朋友的脸，以及我们在成长中所做的一切时，如果你看看Linkedin的注册流，你看看Twitter的注册流，或者你看看WhatsApp在你注册时做了什么，所有这些服务的头号目标，是向你展示你想要关注的人，连接到的人，发送信息给的人，尽可能快，因为在这个垂直方向上，这才是最重要的。当你想到Airbnb或eBay时，关键是找到你真正关心并想要得到的独一无二的物品，PEZ分配器或坏掉的激光笔。就像当你看到你丢失的收藏品，那才是eBay上真正的神奇时刻。当你在Airbnb上看到第一个列表时，你可以呆在一个很酷的房子里，当你进门时，那是一个神奇的时刻。另一方面，当你把房子挂牌时，你第一次拿到钱，是你的神奇时刻；当你在易趣上挂牌时，你第一次拿到钱，是你的神奇时刻。你应该问问布莱恩他是怎么想的，因为他们制作了这些令人惊叹的故事板，我认为这些故事板已经被分享了，关于用户在Airbnb上的生活历程以及它是多么令人兴奋。他将在大约三节课的时间里演讲；他非常擅长谈论神奇的时刻，让用户感受到爱、快乐和所有这些东西。

Think about what the magic moment is for your product, and get people connected to it as fast as possible, because then you can move up where that blue line has asymptotic, and you can go from 60% retention to 70% retention easily if you can connect people with what makes them stick on your site.
想想你的产品的神奇时刻是什么，让人们尽可能快地与它联系起来，因为这样你就可以在蓝线渐近的地方向上移动，如果你能将人们与使他们坚持在你的网站上的东西联系起来，你就可以很容易地从60%的保留率上升到70%的保留率。
The second thing to think about, that everyone in the Valley gets wrong is, we optimize when we think about growth for ourselves. My favorite example is notifications. Again, I’ve talked to and advised many different companies; every single company when they talk about notifications goes ‘Oh, I’m getting too many notifications, I think that’s what we have to optimize for on notifications.’ Okay, are your power users leaving your site because they’re getting too many notifications? No. Then why would you optimize that? They’re probably grown-ups and they can use filters.
第二件要考虑的事情是，硅谷的每个人都错了，当我们为自己考虑增长时，我们会进行优化。我最喜欢的例子是通知。再次，我和许多不同的公司谈过，并为他们提供过建议；每一家公司在谈论通知时都会说“哦，我收到的通知太多了，我认为这是我们必须优化通知的地方。”好吧，你的超级用户离开你的网站是因为他们收到的通知太多了吗？不。那你为什么要优化它？他们可能是成年人，他们可以使用过滤器。
What you need to focus on is the marginal user. The one person who doesn’t get a notification in a given day, month, or year. Building an awesome product is all about think about the power user, right? Building an incredible product is definitely optimizing it for the people who use your product the most, but when it comes to driving growth, people who are already using your product are not the ones you have to worry about. So in this Danny Ferante video there’s also talk about our growth accounting framework that we use to think about for growth. We looked at new users, resurrected users (people who weren’t on Facebook for 30 days and came back) and churned users. The resurrected and churned numbers for pretty much every product I’ve ever seen dominate the new user account once you reach a sensible point of growth a few years in. And all those users who are churning and resurrecting, had low friend counts, and didn’t find their friends so weren’t connected to the great stuff that was going on on Facebook. So the number one thing we needed to focus on, was getting them to those 10 friends, or whatever number of friends they needed. So think about the user on the margin; don’t think about where yourself (21:08), when you’re thinking about growth.
你需要关注的是边缘用户。在给定的日期、月份或年份内没有收到通知的人。打造一款很棒的产品就是要考虑超级用户，对吧？构建一个令人难以置信的产品无疑是为那些使用你产品最多的人优化它，但是当谈到推动增长时，那些已经在使用你产品的人不是你必须担心的人。所以在这段丹尼·费兰特的视频中，我们还讨论了我们用来思考增长的增长会计框架。我们调查了新用户、复活用户（那些30天没上Facebook又回来的人）和大量用户。我所见过的几乎每一款产品的复活和翻腾的数字，在未来几年内一旦达到合理的增长点，就会主导新的用户帐户。所有那些翻来覆去、死灰复燃的用户，他们的好友数量很低，也没有找到他们的朋友，所以他们与Facebook上的那些伟大的东西没有联系。所以我们需要关注的第一件事，就是把他们交给那10个朋友，或者他们需要的任何数量的朋友。所以，当你考虑成长的时候，不要考虑你自己在哪里（21:08）。
So for operating for growth, what you really need to think about, is what is the North star of your company: What is that one metric, where if everyone in your company is thinking about it and driving their product towards that metric and their actions towards moving that metric up, you know in the long-run your company will be successful. By the way, they’re all probably all correlated to each other, so it’s probably fine to pick almost any metric, whichever one you feel the best about, that aligns with your mission and your values – probably go for that one. But realistically, daily active users fairly correlate to monthly active users; we could have gone with either one. Amount of content shared, also correlates with how many users there are, because guess what? You add a user, they share content. So a lot of things end up being correlated. Pick the one that fits with you and know that you’re going to stick with for a long time. Just have a North Star, and know the magic moment that you know when a user experiences that, they will deliver on that metric for you on the North Star, and then think about the marginal user, don’t think about yourself. Those are, I think, the most important points when operating for growth. Everything has to come from the top.
因此，为了增长而运营，你真正需要思考的是你公司的北极星是什么：这一指标是什么，如果你公司的每个人都在思考这个指标，推动他们的产品朝着这个指标发展，并采取行动朝着这个指标发展，你就知道从长远来看，你的公司会成功的。顺便说一句，它们可能都是相互关联的，所以几乎可以选择任何一个与你的使命和价值观相一致的指标，不管你觉得哪一个最好——可能就选那个。但实际上，每日活跃用户与每月活跃用户相当相关；我们可以选择其中任何一个。分享内容的数量，也与有多少用户有关，因为你猜怎么着？你添加一个用户，他们共享内容。所以很多事情最终都是相互关联的。选择一个适合你的，并且知道你会坚持很长一段时间。只要有一颗北极星，你就知道当一个用户体验到这个神奇的时刻，他们会在北极星上为你传递这个指标，然后想想边缘用户，而不是你自己。我认为，这些是实现增长最重要的一点。一切都要从顶层来。
So the last area is tactics. So let’s say you’ve found your niche market that you’re going to have a monopoly on inside the mousetrap market. It’s a silenced mousetrap fir sitting under beds, so if that the mice come to your bed overnight, they can be killed without waking you up. That’s your niche market. Your mousetrap is better than anybody else for that market. What typically happens in Silicon Valley is, everyone thinks marketers are useless. I thought marketers were useless when I was a Physics student, so I’m sure that you guys as Engineering students you must think that we’re awful people who aren’t useful to have around.
最后一个领域是战术。所以，假设你已经找到了你的利基市场，你将在捕鼠器市场内部垄断。这是一个安静的捕鼠器冷杉坐在床下，因此，如果老鼠来到你的床上过夜，他们可以杀死而不叫醒你。那是你的利基市场。你的捕鼠器在那个市场上比任何人都好。硅谷的典型情况是，每个人都认为营销人员没用。当我还是一个物理系学生的时候，我认为市场营销人员是没用的，所以我敢肯定，你们作为工科学生，你们一定认为我们是可怕的人，周围没有有用的东西。
‘Build it and they will come.’ That is something that is very much the mantra in the Valley, and I don’t believe it’s true; I believe you actually have to work. There’s a good article in the lecture page from interviewing Ben Silverman. We talked about how the growth of Pinterest was driven by marketing. I’m biased of course.
“建造它，他们就会来。”这是山谷里的咒语，我不相信这是真的；我相信你必须工作。讲座上有一篇关于采访本·西尔弗曼的好文章。我们讨论了Pinterest的增长是如何由营销驱动的。我当然有偏见。

The first tactic I want to talk about is internationalization. Facebook internationalized too late. Sheryl said it broadly in public and I definitely agree with that.
我想谈的第一个策略是国际化。Facebook国际化太晚了。谢丽尔在公开场合说了这句话，我完全同意。
One of the biggest barriers to our long-term growth, and one of the biggest things we had to deal with, was all the countries where there were clones. Famously ? (23:55) had Fakebook.css in their HTML, and there were a ton of sites like that out there, whether it was ?, a clear clone, Mixie, Cyworld, Orkut; they were all these different social networks around the world that grew up when Facebook was focused around the U.S. Internationalizing was an important barrier we needed to knock down, and knocking down barriers is often important to think about for growth. Facebook started out as college-only, so every college that it was launched in was knocking down a barrier. When Facebook expanded beyond colleges to high schools, I wasn’t at the company, but that was a company-shaking moment where people questioned whether or not Facebook would survive,if the culture of the site could survive.
阻碍我们长期发展的最大障碍之一，也是我们必须面对的最大问题之一，就是所有有克隆人的国家。出了名？（23:55）有假书.css在他们的HTML中，有很多这样的网站，不管是吗？，一个清晰的克隆，Mixie，Cyworld，Orkut；它们都是在Facebook专注于美国时成长起来的世界各地不同的社交网络。国际化是我们需要打破的一个重要障碍，而打破障碍对于增长来说往往是很重要的。Facebook一开始只是一所大学，所以它创办的每一所大学都在推倒一道障碍。当Facebook从大学扩展到高中时，我不在公司，但那是一个公司震动的时刻，人们质疑Facebook能否生存，如果网站的文化能够生存下去的话。
Then after, expanding from high schools to everyone – that was just before I joined – it was a shocking moment; that’s what spurred the growth up to 50 million, and then we hit a brick wall. When we hit that brick wall, that was when a lot of existential questions were being asked inside Facebook whether any social network could ever get to more than 100 million users. It sounds stupid now, but at that time, no one had ever achieved it. Everyone had tapped out between 50 and 100 million users, and we were worried that it wasn’t possible. That was the point at which the growth team got set up; Chamath brought a bunch of us together. He said very publicly he wanted to fire me on multiple occasions. Without Chamath, I think none of us would have stayed at the company; we were a really weird bunch of people – but it worked out. The two things we did, I think that really drove growth initially was, 1) We focused on that 10 friends in 14 days 2) Getting users to the magic moment. That was something that Zuck drove because we were all stuck in analysis paralysis and, ‘Is it causation? Is it correlation?’ Zuck would say ‘You really think that if no one gets a friend, that they’ll be active on Facebook? Are you crazy?’
之后，从高中扩展到所有人——就在我加入之前——这是一个令人震惊的时刻；正是这一点促使增长到5000万人，然后我们撞上了一堵砖墙。当我们撞上那堵砖墙的时候，Facebook内部有很多存在主义的问题被问到，是否有任何社交网络能够接触到超过1亿的用户。现在听起来很愚蠢，但在那个时候，没有人能做到。每个人都有5000万到1亿的用户，我们担心这是不可能的。那是成长团队成立的时候；查马斯把我们召集到一起。他很公开地说他想解雇我好几次。如果没有查马斯，我想我们谁也不会留在公司里；我们是一群非常奇怪的人——但最终还是成功了。我们做的两件事，我认为最初真正推动增长的是，1）我们在14天内关注了10个朋友2）让用户体验到了神奇的时刻。这是扎克所推动的，因为我们都陷入了分析瘫痪，而且‘这是原因吗？是相关性吗？扎克会说：“你真的认为如果没有人交朋友，他们会活跃在Facebook上吗？你疯了吗？’
The second thing was internationalization – knocking down another barrier. When we launched it, I think there were two things we did really well: 1) Even though we were late (and stressed about being late) we took the time to build it in a scalable way; we moved slow to move fast. You can actually view the full story from Naomi on one of the video links from the lecture page. What we did was draw all the strings on the site in FBT, which is our translation extraction script and then, we created the community translation platform, so we didn’t have just professional translators translating the site, but we could have all our users translating the site. We got French translated in 12 hours. We managed to get, to this day, 104 languages translated by Facebook for Facebook, 70 of those are translated by the community. We took the time to build something, that would enable us to scale.
第二件事是国际化——打破另一个障碍。当我们推出它的时候，我认为有两件事我们做得非常好：1）尽管我们迟到了（而且对迟到感到压力很大），但我们还是花时间以一种可伸缩的方式构建它；我们行动缓慢，行动迅速。你可以在演讲页面的一个视频链接上查看Naomi的完整故事。我们所做的是在FBT中绘制网站上的所有字符串，这是我们的翻译提取脚本，然后，我们创建了社区翻译平台，所以我们不只是有专业的翻译翻译网站，但我们可以让我们所有的用户翻译网站。我们在12小时内翻译了法语。到目前为止，我们设法获得了104种由Facebook为Facebook翻译的语言，其中70种是由社区翻译的。我们花时间建造了一些东西，使我们能够扩展。
The other thing is that we prioritized the right languages. Back then, the four main languages were French, Italian, German, and Spanish (and Chinese, but we are blocked in China). Now look at that list – that’s today’s distribution of languages. Italian isn’t on the list anymore; French and German are about to fall off. In the last year we quadrupled the number of people on Facebook in Hindi. Building for what the world is today is an easy mistake to make, and it’s a lot of what the other social networks did. We built a scalable translation infrastructure that actually enabled us to attack all of the languages, so we could be ready for where the future is going to be. You’ll probably be able to see some of our Internet.org summit in India about where we want to go with language translations.
另一件事是我们优先考虑正确的语言。当时，四种主要语言是法语、意大利语、德语和西班牙语（还有中文，但我们在中国被封锁）。现在看看这个列表-这是今天的语言分布。意大利语已经不在名单上了，法语和德语也即将消失。去年，我们用印地语在Facebook上的人数翻了两番。为今天的世界而建设是一个容易犯的错误，这是其他社交网络所做的很多事情。我们建立了一个可扩展的翻译基础设施，使我们能够攻击所有的语言，所以我们可以为未来做好准备。你可能会看到我们的一些互联网.org在印度举行的语言翻译峰会。

These are the tactics I want to go through now: Virality, SEO, ESPN, SEM, Affiliates/referral programs. I think there are two ways to look at virality. There’s a great book by Adam L. Penenberg called the Viral Loop that goes through a bunch of case studies of companies that have grown through viral marketing. I strongly encourage you to read this book if you’re interested in viral marketing, as well as advertising. I think Ogilvy on Advertising is great as well because in the chapter 7 you can’t think of anything else stick a car to billboard with super glue and people will buy the super glue. He has some really great creative tips. So virality. Sean Parker has this really great model that he told us about when I joined Facebook, which is to think about virality about a product, in terms of three things. First, is payload – so how many people can you hit with any given viral blast. Second, is conversion rate, and third is frequency. This gives you a fundamental idea of how viral a product is.
这些是我现在要经历的策略：病毒性，搜索引擎优化，ESPN，扫描电镜，附属机构/转介计划。我认为有两种方法来看待病毒性。亚当·L·佩内伯格有一本很棒的书叫做《病毒循环》，书中对通过病毒营销成长起来的公司进行了大量的案例研究。如果你对病毒式营销和广告感兴趣，我强烈建议你读这本书。我认为奥美在广告方面也很好，因为在第七章里，你想不出任何其他的东西，用强力胶把汽车粘在广告牌上，人们就会买强力胶。他有一些非常棒的创意技巧。所以男性化。肖恩·帕克有一个非常棒的模型，他在我加入Facebook时告诉我们，就是从三个方面来考虑产品的病毒式。首先，是有效载荷-那么有多少人可以用任何给定的病毒攻击。二是转换率，三是频率。这让你对产品的病毒性有一个基本的了解。
Hotmail is the canonical example of brilliant viral marketing. Back when Hotmail launched, there were a bunch of mail companies that had been funded and were throwing huge amounts of money at traditional advertising. Back in that time, people couldn’t get free email clients; they had to be tied to their ISP. Hotmail and a couple other companies launched, and their clients were available wherever you went. You could log-in via library internet or school internet, and be able to get access to that. It was a really big value proposition for anyone who wanted to access it. Most of the companies went out there and did big TV campaigns, billboard campaigns, or newspaper campaigns; however, the Hotmail team didn’t have much funding as they did, so they had to scramble around to figure out how to do it. What they did was add that little link at the bottom of every email that said, ‘Sent from Hotmail. Get your free email here.’
Hotmail是出色的病毒式营销的典型例子。早在Hotmail推出时，就有一批邮件公司得到了资金支持，并在传统广告上投入了巨额资金。在那个时代，人们无法获得免费的电子邮件客户端；他们必须与他们的ISP绑定。Hotmail和其他几家公司成立了，他们的客户无论你去哪里都可以找到。你可以通过图书馆的互联网或学校的互联网登录，并能够访问。对于任何想访问它的人来说，这是一个非常重要的价值主张。大多数公司都到那里去做大型的电视宣传、广告牌宣传或报纸宣传；然而，Hotmail团队没有像他们那样有太多的资金，所以他们不得不四处奔波，想办法做到这一点。他们所做的就是在每封邮件的底部添加一个小链接，上面写着“从Hotmail发送”。在这里获取免费电子邮件。”
The interesting thing was that it meant that the payload was low: You email one person at a time, you’re not necessarily going to have a big payload. Maybe you send around one of those spam emails, but I’m not sure I’d click on your link. The frequency is high though, because you’re emailing the same people over and over, which means you’re going to hit those people once, twice, three times a day and really bring up the impressions. The conversion rate was also really high because people didn’t like being tied to their ISP email. So Hotmail ended up being extremely viral because it had high frequency and high conversion rates.
有趣的是，这意味着有效负载很低：你一次给一个人发邮件，你不一定会有很大的有效负载。也许你发了一封垃圾邮件，但我不确定我会不会点击你的链接。但是频率很高，因为你一次又一次地给同一个人发邮件，这意味着你每天要打这些人一次，两次，三次，并且真正地给他们留下印象。转化率也很高，因为人们不喜欢被他们的ISP邮件束缚。所以Hotmail最终被病毒感染，因为它有很高的频率和转换率。
Another example is Paypal. Paypal is interesting because there are two sides to it, the buyer and the seller side. The other thing that is interesting is that its mechanism for viral growth is eBay. So you can use a lot of things for virality that may not look necessarily obviously viral. If you said to a seller that you were going to send them money – I can’t think of a higher conversion rate. Frequency was low, and payload was low. But Paypal did this thing where they gave away money when you got your friends to sign up, and that’s how they went viral on the consumer side. They didn’t have to do that for sellers, because if I said ‘I am going to send you money via this,’ you will take that. And even on the consumer side they went viral because if someone says ‘Sign up for this thing and you’ll get ten bucks.’ Why wouldn’t you? So they were able to go viral because their conversion rate was high on the buyer and the seller side, not because their payload and frequency was high. Make sense?
另一个例子是贝宝。Paypal很有趣，因为它有两个方面，买方和卖方。另一件有趣的事是它的病毒生长机制是eBay。所以你可以使用很多看起来不一定是病毒性的东西。如果你对卖家说你要给他们寄钱-我想不出更高的兑换率了。频率低，有效载荷低。但是Paypal做了这样一件事，当你让你的朋友注册时，他们就把钱送出去了，这就是他们在消费者方面传播的方式。他们不必为卖家这样做，因为如果我说‘我要通过这个给你寄钱’，你会接受的。即使是在消费者方面，他们也会走红，因为如果有人说‘注册这个东西，你会得到十块钱’，你为什么不呢？因此，它们之所以能够走红，是因为它们的转换率在买卖双方都很高，而不是因为它们的有效载荷和频率很高。有道理？
This is a really good way to look at virality if you want to say, ‘Is this product viral?’ Facebook was not viral via email sharing or anything like that. Facebook was purely viral via word of mouth. The interesting thing about Paypal and Hotmail, is to use them, the first person has to send an email to a person who wasn’t on the service. With Facebook, there is no native way to contact people who aren’t on the service. Everyone thinks that Facebook is a viral marketing success, but that’s actually not how it grew. It was word of mouth virality because it was an awesome product you wanted to tell your friends about.
如果你想说‘这个产品是病毒性的吗？’？“Facebook并不是通过电子邮件分享之类的方式传播的。Facebook纯粹是通过口碑传播的。Paypal和Hotmail的有趣之处在于，使用它们时，第一个人必须向一个不在服务中的人发送电子邮件。有了Facebook，就没有本地的方式来联系那些不在Facebook上的人。人人都认为Facebook是病毒式营销的成功，但事实上它并不是这样发展起来的。这是口碑的病毒式，因为这是一个了不起的产品，你想告诉你的朋友。

Q: In the first round, it makes sense for there to be a low payload. Will the payload increase in later rounds as the campaign grows and people send more and more e-mails?
Q： 在第一轮中，低有效载荷是有意义的。随着竞选活动的增加和人们发送越来越多的电子邮件，有效负载会在以后的几轮中增加吗？
A: First and foremost, I think you only send emails to a small number of people. So compared to the massive viral engines that exist today, where you import someone’s entire contact book and send them all an e-mail, or where you post to everyone’s friends on Facebook, the actual payloads are still very small even if it’s everyone that you e-mail on a frequent basis you hit. I’m also thinking per email sent out, how many people are on it. But it’s a fair point that as more people get on Hotmail, they’ll send more emails, and as more people use email, the product grows more and more successfully.
A： 首先，我认为你只给少数人发电子邮件。因此，与现在存在的大规模病毒引擎相比，你导入某人的整个联系人簿并向他们发送一封电子邮件，或者在Facebook上向每个人的朋友发帖，即使是你经常发电子邮件的每个人，实际的有效载荷仍然非常小。我也在想每发一封邮件，上面有多少人。但公平地说，随着越来越多的人使用Hotmail，他们会发送更多的电子邮件，而且随着越来越多的人使用电子邮件，该产品的发展也越来越成功。
Q: Does a point of conversion matter as well?
Q： 转换点也很重要吗？
A: On Hotmail you click to sign up, but on a billboard you have to remember the URL, go to the website, type it in, find the registration button, click register and sign up. Anything you can do to move friction out of the flow, do it. Going from a billboard ad to an online ad removes huge amounts of friction from the flow.
A： 在Hotmail上，你可以点击注册，但在广告牌上，你必须记住网址，进入网站，键入，找到注册按钮，点击注册并注册。你能做的任何事情都可以把摩擦力从流动中移开，去做吧。从一个广告牌广告到一个在线广告消除了流量的巨大摩擦。
Q: Are frequency and conversation rate related?
Q： 频率和谈话频率相关吗？
A: Absolutely. If you hit someone with the same email over and over again, or the same banner ad, the same rules apply to every channel. The more times you hit someone with the same Facebook ad, the less they’ll click. That’s why we have to, like creative exhaustion, rotate creatives on Facebook. Same with banner ads and news feed stories. The fiftieth time you see that IQ story on your news feed, you are not going to want to click on it. The same is true with these emails. So if you send the same email to people over and over again with an invite, you will get a lower conversion rate. ‘The more you hit someone with the same message, the less they convert’ is fundamental across every online marketing channel.
A： 当然。如果你一次又一次地用同一封邮件或者同一条横幅广告打某人，同样的规则适用于每个频道。你用同样的Facebook广告打别人的次数越多，他们点击的次数就越少。这就是为什么我们必须像创意枯竭一样，在Facebook上轮换创意人员。同样的横幅广告和新闻提要故事。当你第五十次在新闻提要上看到智商故事时，你不会想点击它。这些电子邮件也是如此。因此，如果你一次又一次地用邀请发送同一封电子邮件给别人，你会得到更低的转化率。“你用同样的信息打别人越多，他们转化的就越少”是每个在线营销渠道的基本原则。
Second way to look at virality, which I think is awesome, is by this guy Ed. Ed runs the growth team at Uber now; he was at the growth team at Facebook. He was a Stanford MBA student, and did a class similar to this where they talked about virality and built viral products. The interesting thing is, if you look at Uber, they’re incredibly focused on drivers. It’s a two-sided market place, so they need drivers. It’s a huge part of their focus as a team, even though they’ve got probably the best viral guy in the world at the company.
第二种看病毒性的方法，我认为这是可怕的，是由一个人埃德。埃德现在在优步管理增长团队；他在Facebook的增长团队。他是斯坦福大学的MBA学生，上过类似的课，他们讨论了病毒性并构建了病毒性产品。有趣的是，如果你看看Uber，他们非常关注司机。这是一个双面市场，所以他们需要司机。作为一个团队，这是他们关注的一个重要部分，尽管他们在公司里可能有世界上最好的病毒传播者。
So with virality, you get someone to contact import (35:12) let’s say. Then the question is, how many of those people do you get to send imports? Then, to how many people? Then, how many click? How many sign up? And then how many of those import. So essentially you want people to sign up to your site to import their contacts. You want to then get them to send an invite to all of those contacts – ideally all of those contacts, not just some of them. Then you want a percentage of those to click and sign up. If you multiply all the percentages/numbers in every point in between the steps, this is essentially how you get to the point of ‘What is the K factor?’ For example, let’s says 100 people get an invite per person who imports, then of those, 10% click, and 50% sign up, and of those only 10 to 20% import, you’re going to be at 0.5 – 1.0 K factor, and you’re not going to be viral. A lot of things like Viddy were very good at pumping up stories. They got the factor over 1, which is perfectly doable. But if you’ve got something that doesn’t have high retention on the backend, it doesn’t really matter. You should look at your invite flow and say ‘okay, what is my equivalent to import, how many people per import are invites sent to, how many of those receive clicks, how many of those convert to my site, how many of those then import,’ in order to get an idea of you K factor. The real important thing is still to think about retention, not so much virality, and only do this after you have a large number of people retained on your product per person who signs up.
所以有了病毒性，你可以找人联系import（35:12）。那么问题是，你有多少人可以寄进口货？那么，给多少人？那么，点击多少次？有多少人报名？还有多少是进口的。所以基本上你希望人们注册到你的网站来导入他们的联系人。然后你想让他们向所有这些联系人发送邀请-理想情况下是所有这些联系人，而不仅仅是一些联系人。然后你需要一个百分比的点击和注册。如果你把每一步之间的每一点上的所有百分比/数字相乘，这就是你如何得出“什么是K因子？”？例如，假设每个导入的人有100个人收到邀请，那么其中10%的人点击，50%的人注册，而那些只有10%到20%导入的人，你的系数是0.5-1.0k，你不会被病毒感染。很多像维迪这样的人都很擅长编故事。他们得到的系数大于1，这是完全可行的。但是如果你有一些东西在后端没有很高的保留率，这其实并不重要。你应该看看你的邀请流，然后说“好吧，我的导入等价物是什么，每次导入邀请发送给多少人，有多少人收到点击，有多少人转换到我的网站，有多少人然后导入”，以便了解你。真正重要的是仍然要考虑保留，而不是太多的病毒式，只有当你有大量的人保留在你的产品上，每个人谁注册了。
A couple more things we are going to touch on: SEO, emails, SMS, and push notifications.
我们还将讨论一些东西：搜索引擎优化、电子邮件、短信和推送通知。
In SEO, there are three things you need to think about. First one is keyword research. People do this badly all the time. So I launched this cocktail site I told you about, I spend a year optimizing it to rank for the word cocktail making, but it turns out in the UK, no one searches for cocktail making- about 500 a month; I dominated that search, it was awesome! 400 visitors a month, it was amazing. Everyone searches for cocktail recipes, and in the U.S., everyone searches for drink recipes. So I optimized for the wrong word. You have to do your research first about what you’re going to go after.
在搜索引擎优化，有三件事你需要考虑。一是关键词研究。人们总是做得很糟糕。所以我建立了一个鸡尾酒网站，我告诉过你，我花了一年的时间优化它，让它成为鸡尾酒制作这个词的排名，但是在英国，没有人搜索鸡尾酒制作——大约每月500个；我主导了这个搜索，太棒了！每月400名游客，真是太棒了。每个人都搜索鸡尾酒配方，在美国，每个人都搜索饮料配方。所以我选错了词。你得先研究一下你要追求什么。
Research consists of, what do people search for that’s related to your site, how many people search for it, how many other people are ranking for it, and how valuable is it for you? Supply, demand, and value. So, do your keyword research to figure out which keyword you want to rank for. There are many great tools out there. Honestly the best one is still Google AdWords keyword planner tool.
研究内容包括，人们搜索什么与你的网站相关，有多少人搜索它，有多少人在排名，它对你有多大的价值？供给、需求和价值。所以，做你的关键字研究，找出你想排名的关键字。外面有很多很棒的工具。老实说，最好的仍然是谷歌广告词关键字规划工具。
Once you’ve done that, the next most important thing is links. Page ranks is essentially how all SEO is driven, and Google is based on authority. Now there’s a lot of other things in Google’s algorithm now, like, do people search for your website, there’s a lot of stuff about what the distribution of what the anchor text is that’s sent to your site, so that if you abuse it or spam it, they can pop out with spam. White text on a white background five pages below the fold doesn’t work anymore.
一旦你做到了，接下来最重要的事情就是链接。页面排名本质上是所有搜索引擎优化是如何驱动的，谷歌是基于权威。现在在谷歌的算法中还有很多其他的东西，比如，人们搜索你的网站，有很多关于锚文本的分布的东西被发送到你的网站，所以如果你滥用它或垃圾邮件，他们可以弹出垃圾邮件。白色背景上的白色文字折叠下面的五页已经不起作用了。
But the single most important thing is to get valuable links from high authority websites for you to rank in Google. Then you need to distribute that love inside your site by internally linking effectively. We launched SEO in September 2007; I joined Facebook November 2007. When we launched it, but we were getting no traffic from the pages we had launched, public user profiles. So when I went in and looked at it, the only way you could get into any public user profile was to click on the foot of the page for the about link, then click on the blog articles, then click on one of the authors, and then spider out through their friends to get all their friends.
但最重要的一件事是从权威网站获得有价值的链接，让你在谷歌排名。然后你需要通过有效的内部链接在你的网站中传播你的爱。我们在2007年9月推出了SEO；我在2007年11月加入了Facebook。当我们启动它，但我们没有得到流量从我们推出的网页，公共用户配置文件。所以当我进去看的时候，你能进入任何公共用户档案的唯一方法就是点击页面底部的about链接，然后点击博客文章，然后点击其中一个作者，然后通过他们的朋友抓取他们所有的朋友。
Turns out that Google was like, ‘They bury these pages, they’re not very valuable. I’m not going to rank them.’ We made one change: We added a directory so that Google could quickly get to every page on the site, and we 100Xed SEO traffic. Very simple change drove a lot of upside by distributing the link love internally.
结果发现，谷歌是这样说的，“他们把这些网页埋了，它们不是很有价值。我们做了一个改变：我们增加了一个目录，这样Google就可以快速访问网站的每一个页面，我们还增加了100倍的SEO流量。非常简单的改变通过在内部分发爱的链接，带来了很多好处。
The last thing is that there’s a whole bunch of table stakes stuff for XML sitemaps, and making sure you have the right headers; it’s all covered really well online for you.
最后一点是，XML站点地图有一大堆关于表的内容，并且要确保您有正确的标题；所有这些都在您的网上得到了很好的覆盖。
Email is dead for people under 25 in my opinion. Young people don’t use email. They use WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, Facebook; they don’t use email. If you’re targeting an older audience, email is still pretty successful. Email still works for distribution, but realistically, email is not great for teenagers – even people at universities. You know how much you use instant messaging apps, and how little you use emails. And you guys are probably on the high scale for email because you’re in Silicon Valley. That being said, on email the things to think about: Email, SMS, and Push Notifications all behave the same way. They all have questions of deliverability, so to finish to finish first, first you have to finish. Your email has to get to someone’s inbox. So if you send a lot of spam, end up with dirty IPs, or send email from shared servers where other people are sending spam from, you are going to end up being put in the spam folder consistently and your email will fail completely. You may end up being blocked and have your email bounce. There’s a lot of stuff around email where you have to look when you receive feedback from the servers you are sending emails to, 500 series errors versus 400 series errors; you have to be respectful how those are handled. If someone gives you a hard bounce, retry once or twice and then stop trying because if you are someone who abuses people’s inboxes, the email companies spam folder you, and it’s very hard to get out. If you get caught in a spam house link, or anything like that, it’s very hard to get out. It’s really important with email that you are a high class citizen, and that you do good work with email because you want to have deliverability for the long run.
在我看来，电子邮件对于25岁以下的人来说已经过时了。年轻人不使用电子邮件。他们使用WhatsApp、短信、SnapChat、Facebook；他们不使用电子邮件。如果你的目标受众是老年人，电子邮件仍然是相当成功的。电子邮件仍然适用于分发，但事实上，电子邮件对青少年——甚至对大学里的人来说都不是很好。你知道你用了多少即时通讯软件，却很少用电子邮件。你们这些家伙可能因为在硅谷而对电子邮件很感兴趣。也就是说，在电子邮件上要考虑的事情：电子邮件、短信和推送通知的行为方式都是一样的。他们都有交付能力的问题，所以要先完成再完成，首先你必须完成。你的电子邮件必须到达某人的收件箱。因此，如果你发送了大量垃圾邮件，最终IP地址变脏，或者从其他人发送垃圾邮件的共享服务器发送电子邮件，你最终会一直被放在垃圾邮件文件夹中，你的电子邮件将完全失败。你可能最终被阻止，并有你的电子邮件反弹。电子邮件周围有很多东西，当你收到来自发送电子邮件的服务器的反馈时，你必须查看，500系列错误与400系列错误；你必须尊重如何处理这些错误。如果有人给你一个硬反弹，重试一次或两次，然后停止尝试，因为如果你是一个谁滥用别人的收件箱，电子邮件公司垃圾邮件文件夹你，这是很难走出去。如果你被发现在一个垃圾屋链接，或类似的东西，这是很难走出去。对于电子邮件来说，你是一个高质量的公民非常重要，你要做好电子邮件的工作，因为你希望长期有可交付性。
That counts for push notifications and SMS, too. With SMS, you can go buy SMS traffic via grey routes with people who are having phones strung up attached to a computer and pumping out SMSs. That works for a time, but it always gets shut down. I’ve seen so many companies make these mistakes where they think they’re going to grow by using these kinds of tactics. If you can’t get your email, SMS, or Push Notification delivered, you will never get any success from these. You actually spam your power users and give them notifications they don’t care about, making it really hard for them to opt out. Well, they start blocking you, and you can never push them once they’ve opted out of your Push Notifications. And it’s very hard to prompt them to turn them on once they’ve turned them off.
这对推送通知和短信也很重要。有了短信息，你可以通过灰色路线购买短信息流量，用户可以将手机串在电脑上，然后输出短信息。有一段时间是有效的，但总是被关闭。我见过很多公司犯过这样的错误，他们认为通过使用这样的策略他们会成长。如果你不能得到你的电子邮件，短信，或推送通知传递，你将永远不会得到任何成功从这些。实际上，你给你的超级用户发垃圾邮件，给他们不在乎的通知，让他们很难选择退出。嗯，他们开始阻止你，一旦他们选择退出你的推送通知，你就永远不能推他们。一旦他们关掉了它们，就很难提示他们打开它们。
So number one thing to think about regarding email, SMS, and Push Notifications is, you have to get them delivered. Beyond that, it’s a question of open rate, click rate. So what is the compelling subject line you can put there so the people can open your email, and how can you get them to click when they visit?
因此，关于电子邮件、短信息和推送通知，首先要考虑的是，你必须让它们送达。除此之外，这是一个开放率的问题，点击率。那么，你可以把什么吸引人的主题放在那里，让人们打开你的电子邮件，你如何让他们在访问时点击？
Everyone focuses towards doing marketing emails that are just spam in my opinion. Newsletters are stupid. Don’t do newsletters because you’ll send the same newsletter to everyone on your site. Someone who signed up to your site yesterday versus someone who’s been using your product for three years – do they need the same message? No.
在我看来，每个人都把精力放在做那些只是垃圾邮件的营销邮件上。时事通讯是愚蠢的。不要发送新闻稿，因为你会将相同的新闻稿发送给网站上的每个人。昨天注册你网站的人和使用你产品三年的人-他们需要相同的信息吗？不。
The most effective email you can do is notifications. So what are you sending? What should you be notifying people of? This is a great place where we’re in the wrong mindset. As a Facebook user, I don’t want Facebook to email me about every ‘like’ I receive, because I receive a lot of them since I have a lot of Facebook friends. But as a new Facebook user, that first ‘like’ you receive is a magic moment. Turning on notifications throughout all of our channels, increased on our emails, SMS, and Push Notifications, but we only turned it on for low-engaged users who weren’t coming back to the site, so it wouldn’t be spamming for them.
你能做的最有效的电子邮件是通知。你要送什么？你应该通知人们什么？这是一个我们错误思维的好地方。作为一个Facebook用户，我不希望Facebook把我收到的每一个“喜欢”都发邮件给我，因为我收到了很多，因为我有很多Facebook朋友。但作为Facebook的新用户，你收到的第一个“喜欢”是一个神奇的时刻。打开我们所有频道的通知，增加我们的电子邮件、短信和推送通知，但我们只为不回来的低参与度用户打开通知，所以不会向他们发送垃圾邮件。
So it was a great experience to think about that. The first thing you need to think about when sending emails, SMS, and Push Notifications is what notifications should we be sending. The second thing you need to be thinking about is how can you create great triggered marketing campaigns. When someone created their first cross-border trade transaction was one of the best email campaigns I was ever part of at eBay in terms of click through rate. It was awesome because it was really timely, and really in context – the right thing to do for the user.
所以想想这是一次很棒的经历。在发送电子邮件、短信和推送通知时，首先需要考虑的是我们应该发送什么通知。第二件事，你需要考虑的是如何创建伟大的市场营销活动。当有人创建了他们的第一个跨境贸易交易是一个最好的电子邮件活动，我在易趣的一部分，通过点击率。这真是太棒了，因为它非常及时，而且非常符合实际情况——这是为用户做的正确的事情。
I’d say make sure you have deliverability. Focus on notifications and triggered based emails, SMS, and Push Notifications.
我要说的是确保你有交付能力。关注通知和基于触发的电子邮件、短信和推送通知。
There’s one thing I wanted to finish with, which is my favorite quote by General Patton. It’s so cliche; it’s crazy, but it’s awesome.
有一件事我想结束，那是我最喜欢的巴顿将军的话。太陈词滥调了；太疯狂了，但太棒了。
“A good plan, violently executed today, is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.”
“一个好的计划，在今天被猛烈地执行，总比一个完美的计划在明天好。”
And one other thing that Chamath instills in us and Mark still instills across the whole of Facebook is move fast and don’t be afraid to break stuff. If you can run more experiments than the next guy, if you can be hungry for growth, if you can fight and die for every extra user and you stay up late at night to get those extra users, to run those experiments, to get the data, and do it over and over and over again, you will grow faster.
还有一件事，查马斯灌输给我们和马克仍然灌输整个Facebook是行动迅速，不要害怕打破东西。如果你能比下一个家伙做更多的实验，如果你渴望成长，如果你能为每一个额外的用户而战斗和牺牲，为了得到这些额外的用户而熬夜，为了运行那些实验，为了得到数据，并且一次又一次地做，你会成长得更快。
Mark has said he thinks we won because we wanted it more, and I really believe that. We just worked really hard. It’s not like we’re crazy smart, or we’ve all done these crazy things before. We just worked really really hard, and we executed fast. I strongly encourage you to do that. Growth is optional.
马克说他认为我们赢是因为我们更想要它，我真的相信这一点。我们真的很努力。我们又不是很聪明，或者我们以前都做过这些疯狂的事情。我们真的很努力，而且执行得很快。我强烈建议你这样做。增长是可选的。